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This article first employs the principles of treaty interpretation, in conjunction with the travaux préparatoires and subsequent interpretations, to identify a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. Second, the identified good faith interpretation is used to analyse the approaches of both the ECtHR and HRC in analogous cases concerning the right to manifest religion. The potential implications of the ECtHR adhering to a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion are elaborated. Third, it is argued that by permitting societal consensus to dictate the content of the right, the ECtHR has allowed the scope of the right to freedom of religion to be narrowed to the extent that it does not achieve its original purpose.
IDENTIFYING A 'GOOD FAITH' INTERPRETATION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR

BELIEF
The ECtHR and HRC have reached contradictory decisions in analogous cases concerning the right of Sikhs to manifest their religion by wearing the keski and turban. 9 The inconsistent interpretation of the right to manifest religion has the Accepted Version -Legal Studies: The Journal of the Society of Legal Scholars 5 potential to undermine its universal protection and has implications for legal certainty.
Consequently, it is not possible for both approaches to be 'correct'. It is, therefore, necessary to examine which approach is most consistent with a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion or belief. In accordance with article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 'the general rule', '[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'.
The ECtHR has also established the principle that limitations on Convention rights 'cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right'. 10 The concept of the 'essence of the right' has been interpreted to refer to 'an absolute indispensable core to the right which cannot be impaired regardless of the circumstances' 11 and, thus, should align with the right's object and purpose.
Recourse to the travaux préparatoires of human rights instruments facilitates the identification of a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion by revealing the context of the adoption of individual rights and the intention of the parties. However, as human rights instruments are 'living instruments', the use of the travaux préparatoires must be approached with caution, 12 as it may result in a static and restrictive interpretation of the right. 13 Letsas has distinguished between the concrete and the abstract intentions of the drafters in this respect: 'they had a concrete idea of what human rights there are but it was their more abstract belief in the moral objectivity and universality of these rights that led them to draft the ECHR'. 14 The concrete intentions of the drafters are reflective of society in the ten drafting States of the ECHR in the late 1940s, 15 and, thus, do not assist the identification of a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. 16 In contrast, the abstract intentions of the drafters, identified through the travaux préparatoires, reveal the object and purpose of human rights instruments.
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In this section the principles of treaty interpretation are used to establish a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. The text of the right to manifest religion is considered separately from its context and object and purpose.
The evidence provided by the travaux préparatoires will be considered alongside the subsequent interpretation of the content of the right by the ECtHR and HRC, in order to avoid the identification of a static interpretation of freedom of religion. The text of the right to freedom of religion or belief provides a useful starting point from which to identify a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion.
(a) The Text of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief
Nonetheless, as the adoption of a strict textual approach to treaty interpretation has the potential to lead to a narrow understanding of the right, this must be supplemented with the consideration of the context and object and purpose.
The right to freedom of religion or belief is enshrined in article 9(1) ECHR, article 18 ICCPR and article 18 UDHR. Article 9(1) ECHR establishes that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Crawford has opined that 'the language of treaties … will be read so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the treaty in its context'. The HRC also considered the potential for the initial interference to result in continuing violations of the applicants' rights 'because he would always appear without his religious head covering in the identity photograph and could therefore be compelled to remove his turban during identity checks'. 83 By scrutinising the justifications given by the State for the restriction of the right to manifest religion, the HRC was able to assess the proportionality of the interference and, in particular, identify the potential for repeat violations to flow from the original restriction. On the basis of the lack of evidence of the necessity of the restriction, the HRC found a violation of article 18 ICCPR. Thus, the HRC prioritised the applicants' right to manifest their religion above the justifications given by the State. This approach conforms with the requirement that the State evidence the necessity of limitations and, thus, is compatible with a good faith interpretation of the right.
In contrast, in Mann Singh v France, the ECtHR found that the application was manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, inadmissible, on the basis that the State has a wide margin of appreciation in matters concerning 'public safety' and 'public order'.
In direct contrast to the HRC, the ECtHR accepted that the removal of the turban was necessary to allow the identification of the driver and avoid fraud, 84 despite the lack of evidence to support this conclusion. By not engaging with the necessity and proportionality of the restriction on the applicant's rights, the ECtHR, in effect,
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Ibid. 93 In particular, the penalty of expulsion from school was considered to be disproportionate and not based on the conduct of the applicant himself. 94 The HRC was, thus, not willing to accept that the restriction of the applicant's right to manifest religion was justified by the pursuit of secularism alone. The HRC found a violation of article 18 ICCPR as there was insufficient evidence of the necessity of the restriction and the penalty for wearing the keski was disproportionate.
In the cases of Jasvir Singh v France and Ranjit Singh v France, the ECtHR built on its earlier jurisprudence concerning the restriction of the right to manifest religion on the basis of 'the constitutional principle of secularism' 95 and found the claims to be manifestly ill-founded. 96 The ECtHR found that the expulsion of the applicants from State Schools was not disproportionate to the aim pursued: 'the protection of the rights and freedoms of others' and 'public order' through the pursuit of secularist policies in State schools. Notably, the ECtHR did not consider whether the individual applicants posed a threat to 'the rights and freedoms of others', as the measures taken in pursuit of laïcité fell within the State's margin of appreciation. 
Accepted Version -Legal Studies: The Journal of the Society of Legal Scholars
28
The distinction between the ECtHR and HRC's decisions can be attributed to the extent to which they were willing to engage with the necessity of restrictions justified by the pursuit of secularism. The HRC has questioned the necessity of restrictions in schools on the basis 'that respect for a public culture of laïcité would not seem to require forbidding wearing such common religious symbols'. 98 In contrast, the ECtHR has permitted France a wide margin of appreciation in the absence of an established consensus on this issue in Europe. 99 This has led the ECtHR to uncritically accept the legitimacy of restrictions of religious freedom justified by the pursuit of secularist policies.
Although secularism is not expressly mentioned as a ground for the limitation of the right to manifest religion, to the extent that this principle seeks to protect 'the rights and freedoms of others' and 'public order', it is possible to justify the extension of the limitations clause within a good faith interpretation. However, this is not by itself sufficient to establish that the restriction of the applicant's rights is necessary in a democratic society. In order to prevent unnecessary State interference with religious freedom, the limitations clause must be construed narrowly and restrictions must be proportionate.
(i) The Prioritisation of Secularism above Religious Freedom
A good faith interpretation of religious freedom requires that priority is afforded to the right itself and that the necessity of limitations is evidenced. In the context of (
ii) Secularism as the Protector of Individual Religious Freedom?
The margin of appreciation afforded to France, in Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, is based on the presumption that the pursuit of State secularism, through the separation If the State is able to demonstrate that the pursuit of secularism seeks to protect 'the rights and freedoms of others' or 'public order', in accordance with a good faith interpretation, it must still evidence the necessity of any restrictions imposed on this basis. The difference between the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and HRC can also be attributed to the extent to which the bodies were willing to accept that the presence of religion in the public sphere constituted a threat to 'the rights and freedoms of others'
or 'public order'.
The approach of the ECtHR to date has been motivated by the concern that those wearing religious symbols in the public sphere may be 'seeking to provoke a reaction, proselytizing, spreading propaganda or undermining the rights of others'.
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However, by attributing a meaning to religious symbols, the ECtHR prejudges the 'threat' posed by the individual to 'the rights and freedoms of others' and 'public order'. The ECtHR has accepted that the crucifix 'is an essentially passive symbol ', 119 whereas, the hijab is a 'powerful external symbol'. As the right to manifest religion explicitly encompasses public manifestations, the mere presence of religion in the public sphere cannot per se constitute a threat to 'the rights and freedoms of others'. Moreover, the possible discomfort of the majority at the increased visibility of minority religious symbols in Western Europe cannot justify their elimination, as there is no right not to be offended within the ECHR. 132 It is submitted that the only threat posed by the presence of religious symbols in schools is to hostile secularism. However, as noted above, in its hostile form, secularism does not seek to protect 'the rights and freedoms of others' but rather seeks to eliminate religion from the public sphere. As this is not the purpose for which limitations were prescribed, and in the absence of a demonstrable threat to either 'public order' or 'the rights and freedoms of others', secularism does not justify the restriction of the right to manifest religion.
In Jasvir Singh and Ranjit Singh, the ECtHR did not require evidence of a threat posed by the individual applicants. This approach is incompatible with a good faith interpretation of the right as it undermined the intention that non-interference with religious freedom should be the default position, unless restrictions are proven to be necessary. In direct contrast, in Bikramjit Singh, the HRC was not willing to accept that secularism was sufficient to justify restrictions on the applicant's right without evidence of 'a threat to the rights and freedoms of other pupils or to order at the school'. This approach has been demonstrated to be incompatible with a good faith interpretation of religious freedom.
Had the ECtHR engaged with the necessity of restricting Jasvir Singh and 
